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“A New Type of Revolution”: Socialist Thought in India, 1940s-1960s 
 
Taylor C. Sherman 
Department of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 
UK 
 
Abstract: Although it is often said that early postcolonial India was socialist, scholars have tended to 
take this term for granted. This article investigates how Indians defined socialism in the two decades 
after independence. It finds that there were six areas of agreement among Indian socialists: the 
centrality of the individual, the indispensability of work, the continued importance of private 
property, that the final goal was a more equal – but not flat – society, that this change had to be 
brought about without violence, and that the final goal of Indian socialism ought to be spiritual 
fulfilment. Understanding how Indians defined their version of socialism, it is argued, will help 
scholars re-evaluate the role of the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in defining the goals India 
pursued after independence. It will also re-orient our understanding of the expectations and 
limitations of the Indian state in this crucial period in Indian history. 
 
Keywords: socialism, postcolonial political thought, Gandhian political thought, Nehruvian 
consensus, state, cooperatives 
 
Scholarship on the history of early postcolonial India has begun to gain pace over the past decade or 
more. Clustering around the aftermath of partition,1 development programmes,2 and India’s 
democratic state,3 historians have begun to reveal a more complex and dynamic picture of the first 
two decades after independence. In these works, readers find frequent mention of India’s socialism 
in this period. And yet, this supposedly foundational ideology remains largely unexamined. This gap 
in the scholarship is surprising because many Indians acknowledged after 1947 that the ideas that 
had underpinned the previous four decades of political organisation, viz. nationalism, were no longer 
sufficient to give shape to political life in independent India. Thus, although postcolonial Indian 
history is notoriously hampered by a dearth of sources, there is no shortage of published works by 
Indian political thinkers after 1947. The decades after independence, it turns out, were a time of 
intense discussion about which ideas and ideals ought to underpin the new nation. The following 
pages explore socialist thought in mid-twentieth-century India with the objective of sketching the 
outlines of Indian socialism for the first time.  
 
Although this is an exploration of ideas rather than action, identifying the main features of Indian 
socialism engenders a broader re-assessment of early postcolonial Indian history in three ways. 
Firstly, whereas the existing scholarship tends to regard Jawaharlal Nehru as the primary 
philosopher-king and architect of independent India, the follow pages reveal him to be a more 
marginal character when it came to defining the content of Indian socialism. Secondly, challenging 
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the existing consensus about India in this period, this research highlights the relatively limited role of 
the state in Indian Socialist thought. India’s was a socialism of scarcity and self-help. India’s socialists, 
while not discounting the state altogether, emphasised the development of the individual and the 
importance of voluntary collective action to achieve the revolution they imagined. Finally, the article 
seeks to bring to light the unwritten hierarchies of gender and class that were embedded in 
postcolonial socialist thinking. In so doing, the aim is to provide a clearer picture of the possibilities 
and the limitations of this seminal Indian ideology.   
 
Until very recently, historians have not deemed socialist political thought in India to be worthy of 
much attention. To one group of scholars, socialism in India was seen to be, at best, an off-the-shelf 
variation of socialist thought developed elsewhere, or, at worst, an unfortunate imitation of 
economic ideas centring on the planned economy which fit very poorly in India.4 Recent scholarship, 
however, has undermined the idea that India’s five-year plans were at the heart of Indian socialism. 
Planning, it has been shown, is not inherently socialist.5 Moreover, capitalists were often able to co-
opt or simply undercut any socialist aims in the five-year plans.6 In light of these developments, this 
article seeks to broaden the scope of enquiry beyond the plans to explore the wider range of ideas 
which constituted Indian socialism.  
 
To another group of scholars, Indian socialism and Nehruvian socialism were virtually coterminous.7 
However, Nehru preferred not to turn what he termed his ‘basic approach’ into a more elaborate 
political philosophy. The focus on Nehru, therefore, has both overstated his importance and painted 
a misleading picture of uniformity (or worse, barrenness) in Indian political thinking after 1947. 
Christopher Bayly, in one of his last articles, began to take Indian socialism seriously, turning his 
attention beyond Nehru to his close circle of peers. Bayly seemed to conclude, however, that India’s 
socialists were not really very socialist at all. Rather, their thought was not much more than an 
amalgam of fragments of other great doctrines, including liberal democracy, communitarianism and 
eugenics.8 Although he acknowledged that these ideas were transformed as they were imported 
from outside, Bayly’s primary method was to assess Indian ideas according to the degree to which 
they conformed to concepts developed outside of India.  
 
This article adopts a different methodology. While sensitive to the global flow of ideas, it examines 
Indian socialism on its own terms, rather than by holding it up to an imagined pure form of socialism 
developed elsewhere.9 Indeed, historians of socialist ideas in Europe have discarded the notion that 
there was ever a single, cardinal version of the creed.10 Indian socialists engaged with socialist 
thought and policy around the world. Thus, this might be thought of as a work of pluralisation, 
exploring the multivalent development of socialist ideas as they circulated through India in the 
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middle of the twentieth century. To this end, this article explores the thinking of those who 
identified themselves as socialist. Some of the individuals wore the mantle of socialism lightly, using 
the term frequently, but declining to define it. Others thought and wrote extensively, defining Indian 
socialism for themselves and, they hoped, for a larger audience. Others still, remained busy with 
their own projects, only referring to socialism at the margins. Focusing primarily on published works 
in which these thinkers defined the problems of the day and the aims of the revolutions they 
pursued, this research identifies themes that were central to the project that these thinkers called 
socialism.  
 
In the following pages, Indian socialist thought is divided into three strands. In so doing, the aim is 
not to imply that these were discrete schools of thought within the socialist tradition. Rather, the 
object is to provide a structure within which it is easier to bring out the texture of Indian socialist 
thinking. The first strand might be called the Congress Left. They included India’s first Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, but to label them Nehruvian socialists would overstate his influence. 
Nehru did not much care to philosophise about what socialism was. He preferred to ‘avoid precise 
definitions because they tend to become dogmas and slogans which come in the way of clear 
thinking’.11 Just as this strand was not confined to one person, the Congress Left also did not 
encompass the whole party, which embraced a far wider span of ideas. Those considered below 
include Vijayalakshmi Pandit, an eminent diplomat of the era and Nehru’s sister, and Sampurnanand, 
a prominent Congressman from Uttar Pradesh. These men and women articulated their version of 
socialism in speeches to national and international audiences, and they wrote treatises on Socialism 
to refine their ideas. Those in this strand did tend to accept the necessity of using the levers of state 
power to pursue India’s social and economic transformation. However, one must not overstate the 
importance of the state in this line of thinking.12 Members of the Congress Left were also advocates 
of self-help in building a socialist society. Bottom-up activity was admired in part because the state 
lacked the resources to act in many fields, but also because self-help was regarded as an essential 
element of individual growth and societal advancement. 
 
The second strand might be called the Opposition Socialists. This group included the Socialist Party, 
or Praja Socialist Party (PSP), as it became known after 1952. Although originally part of the Congress 
(and known as the Congress Socialist party), the Socialist Party, broke away with the aim of 
becoming the main opposition party to the Congress.13 The PSP was a constantly changing 
organisation, combining with the Kisan Mazdoor Party, and then later splitting in 1955. Many of 
these Opposition Socialists were associated with the PSP, but only for a time. One of the main 
ideologues in this group was Rammanohar Lohia, who founded the Party’s journal, Mankind, and 
served as the PSP’s General Secretary for a short time. Others like Jayaprakash Narayan, joined 
briefly and then moved on. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, who was one of the founding members of 
the Congress Socialist Party, falls into this grouping. She pressed for women’s uplift, assisted in 
refugee rehabilitation, and worked for the revival of indigenous performative arts and village 
handicrafts. After an unsuccessful bid for elected office on a Socialist Party ticket in the first general 
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election, she left the party. These men and women ran for and held public offices, published 
regularly on the main issues of the day, and engaged in large-scale political and social work outside 
the purview of government. Like the Congress Left, the Opposition Socialists advocated a mix of 
state action and self-help. However, these socialists were keener than the ruling Congress Party on 
using the tactics of opposition developed during the national movement, such as strikes and 
satyagraha (civil disobedience).14 Unlike many members of the Congress, who grew uncomfortable 
at the mention of caste, the PSP was an early advocate of reservations for Dalits and Adivasis, as well 
as for women and ‘backward castes’.15 
 
The final strand was the Gandhian Socialists. Many of these men and women did not always use the 
term socialism, preferring instead the Gandhian neologism, sarvodaya (uplift of all). These included 
the Tamil-Christian economic thinker, J.C. Kumarappa, as well as the ascetic crusader, Vinoba Bhave, 
regarded by some (not least himself), as Gandhi’s spiritual heir. Ashoka Gupta, the eminent social 
service worker who devoted her life to refugee rehabilitation and uplift of the rural poor, especially 
women, fell into this group. These women and men tended to be found more often engaging in the 
politics of doing as they worked on the ground to realise their ideals. They also published widely on 
contemporary issues and wrote regularly to state and national leaders, who engaged with their 
ideas. The Gandhians mostly pursued their objectives outside the purview of the state, but one must 
not over-interpret their thinking as being aggressively anti-statist. Many viewed their efforts as 
complementary to state activity. Rather, what truly set them apart from the Congress Left and the 
Opposition Socialists was their advocacy of the austere life, not just for select individuals but for 
everyone. With this ideal they elaborated a fundamentally different approach to the economic life of 
the nation. 
 
It must be admitted from the outset that the division of these thinkers into these three strands is 
somewhat artificial. Indeed, many individuals are not easy to place definitively within one strand, 
not least because their political thinking often entailed a ‘zigzag journey’.16 Thus, Jayaprakash 
Narayan straddled both the Opposition Socialists and the Gandhian Socialists, but also remained 
friends with members of the Congress Left including Nehru. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur had been Gandhi’s 
secretary for sixteen years and shared many of his ideas, but she also took up positions in Nehru’s 
Cabinet after independence. Still, readers more familiar with these figures may bristle at the thought 
of placing Bhave and Lohia in the same orbit, or the Praja Socialist Party with the Gandhians. Only by 
reading these political thinkers together can we begin to discern the fact that they shared a 
reasonably coherent set of ideas that they called Indian Socialism. Like any other tradition of political 
thought, it included not only a shared core, but also debates and lacunae.   
 
These three strands of socialist thought in India evolved over time, developing in dialogue with 
socialisms in the Soviet Union and Europe. To give a schematic picture of this dialogue as it 
developed between the 1930s and 1960s, one can say that in the 1930s, one witnessed the strong 
influence of Marxism and the Soviets on Indian socialists. Many, from Jawaharlal Nehru to 
Jayaprakash Narayan advocated a state monopoly over most of the economy, including industry and 
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trade.17 Still, there were some deviations in these early years: many Indians who were attracted to 
socialism did not agree with the idea that nationalism was a bourgeois ideology. By the 1940s most 
socialists in India were emphasising the importance of pursuing change through peaceful means, 
especially through democratic processes. Along with the rest of the world in the 1950s, many Indian 
socialists began to acknowledge more openly the crimes of Stalinism. Indian socialism evolved to 
decry the way Soviet communism trampled the individual. Equally, socialists in the 1950s began to 
learn from early experiments of government in India after independence. By the 1960s, India’s 
socialism changed further in light of the experience of the first two plans.  
 
Although socialism had wide purchase in postcolonial India, socialist thought was not ubiquitous; it 
was distinct from rival political ideas on the right and on the left. In particular, Indian socialists took 
pains to set themselves apart from the Communist Party of India on at least three fronts. The first 
was the alleged willingness of the communists to resort to violence. Vinoba Bhave, who dedicated 
his life to quelling communist-inspired peasant uprisings in the 1950s derided the apparent 
attachment of India’s communists to violence: ‘Communists would rather accept a stone achieved 
through struggle than a piece of bread secured through persuasion and change of heart.’18 The 
Communist Party of India had initially pursued revolution via peasant revolts, but by 1951, they had 
put down their arms in order to pursue change through the ballot box. Nonetheless, India’s socialists 
continued to accuse communists of advocating violence, ignoring the evolution of communist 
thinking. The second critique of communism was that it required, ‘suppression of individual 
freedom’.19 This criticism gained volume in the 1950s as news of Stalin’s excesses became widely 
accepted in the outside world. Finally, socialists accused India’s Communists of doing Russia’s 
bidding. As Vinoba Bhave put it, ‘If Russia changes its line of action they do likewise. They have no 
independent intelligence of their own.’20 This allegation implied that India’s Communists had 
committed the cardinal sin of a newly independent people: submitting themselves to foreign 
domination again. One suspects that these criticisms were more a caricature than an accurate 
appraisal of communist thought in India.21 However, there are very few studies of communists in 
early postcolonial India, and none that explore their political thought in this period; a comparison of 
India’s two leftist ideologies still awaits its historian.22 
 
In spite of its evolution over time, one can identify a core, which was in place by the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Most socialists agreed that their socialism was not the same as Russian or European 
socialism. In fact, the whole Cold War did not offer much of a choice, whether in foreign policy or 
domestic. Rammanohar Lohia, in his speech to the Asian Socialist Conference held in Rangoon in 
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1952, summarised this feeling when he declared that capitalism and communism were ‘equally 
irrelevant to human civilisation. Votaries of Mr Ford or Mr Stalin may yet wage grim wars but the 
solution of man's misery lies elsewhere.’23 What India needed, instead, in Vinoba Bhave’s words, was 
‘a new type of revolution’.24 
 
Indian socialists believed they could chart a path to this new type of revolution. While there were 
important debates within this tradition, there were six broad areas of agreement: the centrality of 
the individual, the importance of work, the continued relevance of private property, that the final 
goal was a more equal society, the necessity of pursuing their aims without violence, and, finally, 
that Indians’ collective transformation would include a spiritual dimension. After discussing these 
areas of overlapping consensus,25 this article will turn to consider one important lacuna in Indian 
socialist thought: how to move from the reform of individuals to the transformation of society. 
 
For the All-Round Development of the Individual 
 
The central figure of Indian socialism was the individual, and this remained unchanged in the two 
decades after independence. Indian socialists rejected the stark choice between the individual and 
the collective that seemed to be on offer in choosing between western capitalism and communism. 
Instead, the individual and the community were to be reformed together. As Sampurnanand put it, 
'We often hear of the interests of society but, as a matter of fact, society can have no interests other 
than those of its constituent units. Its…sole duty, lies in creating conditions conducive to the free all-
round development of the individual.’26   
 
This surprising focus on the individual had its origins in three historical factors. The first was the 
experience of colonialism. To focus on individual freedom was to discard imperialist practices which 
governed entire populations, and which tended to regard Indian life as dispensable. The second 
influence was anti-colonial thought, especially that of Mohandas K. Gandhi. When it came to the 
relationship between the individual and the collective, Gandhi rejected the utilitarian maxim of the 
greatest good for the greatest number, given the implication that some would always be left behind 
in this equation.27 Indian socialists had adopted a similar position. Describing her work on refugee 
rehabilitation, Ashoka Gupta summarised this approach: ‘just as one cannot ignore the social 
problems in general, ignoring individual/personal problems does not really lead to much progress. 
Overlooking the needs of … even one person in the name of the greater common good burdens the 
mind.’28 Thirdly, the prominent place of the individual owed something to the critique of Stalinism 
which intensified after his death in 1953. Discussing Soviet Communism in 1958, Nehru noted that 
he had ‘the greatest admiration for many of the achievements of the Soviet Union’, but that 
communist countries had been wrong to coerce individuals in the pursuit of larger aims and to 
                                                          
23
 Lohia, Rammanohar, Aspects of Socialist Policy, (Bombay: Socialist Party of India, 1952), p.17. 
24
 Bhave, Vinoba, Bhoodan Yajna (Land-Gifts Mission), (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1953), p.16 
25
 Rawls, John, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7:1 (1987), pp.1-25, 
pp.4-5. 
26
 Sampurnanand, Indian Socialism, pp.9-10. 
27
 Mohandas Gandhi Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2
nd
 edn, 2014), 
p.49 
28
 Gupta, Ashoka, A Fighting Spirit: Selected Writings of Ashoka Gupta. (New Delhi: Niyogi Books, 2013), p.29 
exterminate those who did not comply.29 Indeed, he argued, ‘real social progress will come only 
when opportunity is given to the individual to develop’.30   
 
Just as the individual in British liberalism was implicitly a white, male, property owner,31 the 
individual of Indian socialism, at least in some conceptualisations, was male, Hindu, upper caste and 
land-owning. As Jayaprakash Narayan explained in 1952, reform of society would arise from reform 
of the individual: 'Society cannot be good unless individual men are good’, he went on to add, ‘and 
particularly those men who form the elite of society’.32 Why was this so? For one, most of these 
Indian socialists were themselves from the elite of society, and they sought to understand and 
reform their own class first. Second, they believed that the greatest human endeavour was to serve 
others to the point of voluntarily sacrificing everything in their service.33 As with Gandhian forms of 
social service, this path was closed to those who had nothing to sacrifice, and to those who were 
served.34 This excluded Dalits and Adivasis, backward castes and often women too, anyone, in short, 
who might be on the receiving end of such generosity. Finally, many Gandhian Socialists and 
members of the Congress insisted that the upper classes had to be persuaded, rather than coerced, 
into accepting new property relations. In this schema, the psychological needs of the elite, male, 
property owner outweighed the material needs of the landless labourer or the factory worker. This 
was a form of extreme deference to the privileged classes. 
 
The Opposition Socialists stand out somewhat here. Their written works tended to focus more on 
the plight of and rights of workers and peasants. Additionally, their broad discussions in the 1950s of 
the reform or protection of these groups were sometimes balanced with language lionising them.35 
Moreover, the Opposition Socialists tended to be more willing to use satyagraha and other forms of 
collective political action to bring about what Lohia called ‘a change of heart’ in the propertied 
classes, signifying a slightly less deferential attitude to those with established interests.36   
 
Productive Employment for Personal Growth 
 
The second idea that all these thinkers agreed upon was the sine qua non of work. Work was not 
simply a matter of making the cogs in the economic machine turn. Rather, purposeful occupation 
was widely understood as a means of self-expression and personal growth. Here is the Gandhian 
Socialist, J.C. Kumarappa, in his seminal book, Gandhian Economic Thought: ‘We are a bundle of 
nerves. We have to study, work, play, laugh, etc. for our growth. Work is to our higher faculties what 
food is to the physical body. The occupation we follow should contribute towards the growth of our 
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personality’.37 Productive employment was not just a matter of personal development, however. It 
was a question of building the right kind of citizens for the new India. For the Gandhians, certain 
types of work, especially village industries, were believed to encourage resourcefulness, creativity 
and problem-solving. In so doing, according to Kumarappa, ‘Politically village industries provide the 
conditions for the development of democracy.’38 We see similar ideals among the Congress Left. Not 
only did the plans promise to pursue full employment, but planners and governments made 
frequent appeals to citizens to engage in self-help, in everything from producing khadi (home-spun 
cloth) to digging their own irrigation channels and building their own village schools.39 
 
There were some shades of differentiation in how work was understood between the different 
strands of socialist thought. For the Gandhians, work included not just village industries such as 
making cloth, paper, and bamboo products, but also hard manual labour. According to Rajkumari 
Amrit Kaur, who had been Gandhi’s secretary, and then took on a leading role in public health after 
independence, ‘It is not the work we do that matters, but the spirit in which we do it. The lowest 
kind of work done for the love of God ranks higher with Him than the most brilliant done for 
personal gain. The former sets us free, the latter leads us to greater bondage.’40 J.C. Kumarappa and 
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur were both Gandhians and Christians, and their conception of work was 
influenced by Christian thinking on the virtuous individual, just as Gandhi’s had been.41 
 
For many Opposition Socialists, by contrast, manual labour and village industries were doomed, and 
the key was to use the ‘positive technology of the present age’,42 through the small machine. 
Although small machines, from radios to electric water pumps, were already in use in India,43 the 
Socialist Party Leader, Rammanohar Lohia envisioned much more:  
The small-unit machine run on electricity or oil is the answer. Only a few such 
machines exist; many more will have to be invented. …This machine shall be available 
to hamlet and town as much as to city… This machine will not only solve the 
economic problem of the underdeveloped world; it will also enable a new 
exploration and achievement of the general aims of society.’44  
This was economic salvation through technological innovation, but also through decentralisation, 
one of the ways the Opposition Socialists tried to differentiate themselves from the Congress. While 
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they agreed on the necessity of planning, the Opposition Socialists accused the Congress Left and 
the planners of focusing too much on urban industry to the detriment of rural areas.45  
 
All sides agreed on the centrality of work to the economy, to democracy and to the individual. 
However, there were implicit hierarchies at play in the ways in which the concept was defined. For 
many men in the Congress Left and the Opposition Socialists, purposeful occupation was primarily 
making, not caring. By according more prestige to production, they implicitly discounted the 
everyday occupation of most ordinary women, which centred around caring within the family.46 
Among the Congress Left and the Opposition Socialists, there were calls for women’s equality, but 
they tended to focus on social reform, political participation, and women’s access to waged labour.47 
Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, by contrast, took a refreshingly radical position. She not only called for 
equal wages for men and women, but also insisted that the housewife be accepted as ‘a distinct 
economic entity’ who makes an ‘invaluable contribution’ to the economy.48   
 
For the Gandhians caring work could contribute to personal and social growth, but to do so, the 
carer had to make extraordinary sacrifices. One of the central concepts developed by the Gandhians 
was the notion of ‘gifting’ to others as a means of catalysing a social and economic revolution. This 
idea emerged with the Bhoodan (land-gift) Movement. Gandhi’s self-styled spiritual heir, Vinoba 
Bhave, invented the land-gift as a means of addressing the problem of inequality in rural areas by 
asking landowners to make a gift of part of their land to the landless of their village.49 To the land gift 
was soon added shramdan (labour-gift), sampattidan (property-gift), as well as gramdan, the gift of 
entire villages into cooperative ownership. Perhaps the pinnacle of this theme was jeevandan, the 
gift of one’s life to the cause of improving rural life in India. Jayaprakash Narayan conceived of the 
idea of Jeevandan, in 1954, after becoming increasingly disillusioned with ordinary politics.50 
Jeevandan was a new way of living based on self-sacrifice for the collective good. The jeevandani 
(the person gifting their life), was to give up his property and ‘as far as possible lead a simple life’, 
working with his hands, and using only village products. The aim was to bring about a ‘non-violent 
revolution’ in the countryside.  
 
The gendered expectations behind this kind of work were evident in Narayan’s Guide for Jeevandan: 
jeevandanis had a duty to ensure their wives and children wore khadi and went to schools that 
taught village crafts to young students. In other words, it was expected that jeevandanis would be 
men, and that they would continue to exercise their patriarchal roles within their families. Even as 
they continued to set the norms of behaviour at home, JP wrote, ‘Jeevandanis must free themselves 
from their family responsibilities but, if occasion demands, can devote minimum time required for 
such affairs.’51 However, if a jeevandani was a member of a political party, he could continue as 
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such; if he was a labourer, he ought to continue that work. This placed caring below making and 
ruling in a gendered hierarchy of worthwhile labour.  
 
Socialism Without Abolishing Private Property: Cooperative Self-help 
 
The third feature of socialist thought was the continued relevance of private property in India. This 
was part of the wider deference to existing property holders, but it was also tied to a more 
circumscribed set of expectations about the power of the state to enact change. This position had 
evolved out of experiences in other socialist countries and in India. Jayaprakash Narayan, writing in 
1961, noted that he, like other socialists in India, had once believed that nationalisation was the key 
to building socialism. But he had changed his stance in light of the experience in communist 
countries, where, it had been proven that nationalisation, ‘ends up in the most rigorous economic 
dictatorship, giving rise to new forms of economic exploitation and inequality.’52  
 
The Praja Socialist Party followed a similar path. In 1952 Rammanohar Lohia had argued that 
ownership by individuals or by the state ought to be abolished in favour of collective community 
ownership.53 Within a few years, however, the Party began to argue that private property – albeit 
redistributed – was necessary to increase agricultural production.54 Indeed, by 1956, the PSP was 
going so far as to promise peasants that they would not be forced into cooperatives.55  
 
A similar evolution took place among the Congress Left. The Congress Party’s Economic Committee 
report from January 1948 recommended progressive nationalisation, but under pressure from 
industrialists, the Congress Government dropped plans for the state to take over a large part of 
private industry.56 Moreover, India’s Constitution, ratified in January 1950, protected private 
ownership, providing that no property could be confiscated without compensation.57 When it came 
to rural property, land reform legislation passed in the 1950s set a limit on the maximum amount of 
land that a family could hold (in theory if not in practice), and also fixed prices to enable those who 
worked the land to purchase it. The reforms were based on the idea that private property would 
continue, with ownership configured in slightly different ways.58  
 
It is often assumed in the scholarship that the Congress Left’s approach to private ownership was 
only a concession to propertied classes, which they would reverse if possible. However, reading the 
works of these thinkers one can see that by the 1950s they were comfortable with the continued 
existence of private enterprise and with a more limited role for the state. Instead of calling for 
nationalisation, many were content to simply urge entrepreneurs and business leaders to work for 
the common good rather than only for their own profit.59 For some this was part of a genuine 
scepticism about amassing too much power in the hands of the state. Sampurnanand warned that 
establishing a state monopoly over the economy would not only ‘sound the death knell of all true 
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art, science or literature’, but it would also render citizens ‘helpless and hopeless’ by making them 
entirely dependent upon the state.60  
 
For others, this was rooted in doubts about the capacity of the state to shape large swathes of the 
economy. While the second five-year plan is often regarded as the epitome of socialist state 
planning, with scholars assuming that the planners aimed for the state to take a prodigious role in 
the economy, a closer look reveals the ways in which the planners circumscribed their own 
ambitions. P.C. Mahalanobis, the chief architect of the second plan, partitioned the economy into 
what he called two different ‘spheres’. One sphere, that of large-scale industrial development, he 
argued ought to be directed by the state. But for what he called the ‘diffuse’ sector, he felt state 
intervention would be too difficult.61 To get a sense of the scale of the sphere he set aside, according 
to one estimate, the diffuse or unorganised sector comprised 90% of the employment and 84% of 
India’s gross national product in the early 1950s.62 Here, contrary to what other scholars have 
assumed,63 we find agreement between the Congress Left and the Gandhians that the state ought to 
have a very limited role in reconfiguring property relations when it came to the vast majority of 
economic activity.  
 
Instead of collectivisation or nationalisation, many socialists put great store in the promise 
of voluntary collective association through co-operatives. While it was in line with global 
trends in rural development,64 this faith in the cooperative also had roots in three aspects 
of Indian politics and economics of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The first was the recent 
experience of the national movement, where collective action had achieved the goal of 
purna swaraj (complete self-rule). The second was in the practical matter of India’s poverty. 
The state had so few resources to offer that one of the only ways to move towards less 
stratified property relations was to encourage voluntary cooperation. Finally, socialist 
conceptions of democracy centred on moving forward by consensus, which seemed to fit in 
well with the ideals of the cooperative movement as imagined in mid-century India.  
 
Although there were many non-official cooperatives, one of the main government 
initiatives for encouraging them was the Community Development Programme. Community 
Development was designed to encourage villagers to work together to articulate their own 
development needs and then organise to fulfil them.65 It was imagined that village 
panchayats (councils) would oversee the political life of the village drawing up development 
plans and implementing them, while cooperatives would be the ‘economic arm’ of the 
panchayat.66 The cooperative would promote ‘self-interest by mutual help’ and  its motto 
would be ‘each for all and all for each’.67 In so doing, rural India’s ‘perennial problems’, 
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from underproduction to chronic indebtedness could be ‘solved if farmers co-operate and 
pool their resources in men, money and material and cultivate land for mutual benefit’.68 
Co-operative work towards village development was not a marginal strategy of a 
Government of India otherwise focused on urban industrialisation, as others have argued.69 
Instead, co-operation was the answer to India’s central predicament, which was the 
imperative to pursue economic development without the ability to commit state resources.  
 
However, this utopian vision of revitalised village communities was not egalitarian. Rather, 
the cooperative was, in Nehru’s words, ‘essentially the idea of a big family becoming bigger 
and bigger’. In this family, the stronger sections of society had a ‘moral duty to rehabilitate 
[the] economically weak and socially backward’ of India.70 In other words, instead of being 
eliminated, the hierarchies of caste and class which were at the heart of India’s inequality 
would be re-deployed for the common good. No attempt was made to confront the origins 
of these hierarchies or to redress the centuries of pain inflicted upon the lower castes and 
classes within them.  
 
The Opposition Socialists and the Gandhians had no less utopian ideas about what voluntary 
collective activity could achieve. Indeed, because the focus of both parties’ energies was the 
countryside, and they faced the same fiscal constraints, they suffered from a similar kind of fanciful 
optimism about power of collective self-help. The Gandhian plan for rural reform grew out of the 
bhoodan movement to become the gramdan movement. Gramdan – the gift of the village – was the 
idea that villagers would hand over the ownership and management of all village lands to the village 
council, which would ensure that ‘wealth is utilized equitably for the benefit of every member of the 
community, as also of the community as a whole.’71 As with the Congress Left, this was a plan to 
redeploy existing hierarchies for new ends, rather than to radically reorganise the social life of the 
village.  
 
For the PSP, the origins of a new rural social order would be a ‘Food Army’ of one million volunteers, 
who would clear and cultivate land and then quickly begin to work as cooperatives. This army would 
establish ‘new villages whose joyous life may impel and support neighbouring villages towards 
activity’.72 In spite of practical experiences that would suggest otherwise,73 the cooperative was the 
archetypal institution for a socialism of scarcity.   
 
Less Inequality, but not ‘Dead Equality’ 
 
Outlining the contours of the way the cooperative was imagined as a model for Indian socialism 
helps us understand the fourth theme of the tradition: the common aim was a more equal, but by 
no means flat, society. India arrived at independence with deep and abiding economic and social 
inequalities. India’s nationalists had berated the British for draining India’s wealth, and had promised 
the people the days of scarcity would end with freedom. At the same time, India’s socialists insisted 
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that landowners, capitalists and bureaucrats could not be eliminated, but rather had to be converted 
to a more benevolent mindset. As such, their goal was not to bring about a radical levelling of 
classes; rather it was to trim the more extreme peaks and troughs of India’s inequality.  
 
We do witness some change over time with respect to the overall position on inequality. Through 
the 1950s, the Gandhians and the Congress Left stressed that they were comfortable with a 
differentiated society. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur argued, ‘dead equality there can never and should 
never be. Manifold diversity is a part of the fullness of social life provided man realises that the fruits 
of such diversity are for the use of others.’74 Although members of the Praja Socialist Party wrote 
and spoke in slightly more radical language, they, too wished only to reduce inequality. Their 1957 
election manifesto promised to limit income inequalities to a ratio of 1:10 by adjusting the tax 
regime.75  
 
By the early 1960s, however, those on the left of the Congress were increasingly aware that after 
more than a decade in power they had moved further away from the goal of a more equal society. 
Congress rhetoric shifted to focus on equality of opportunity, rather than equality of outcome.76 As 
the Congress tilted to the right, the Opposition Socialists inclined to the left. Recognising inequality 
was primarily a function of caste, Rammanohar Lohia’s new Socialist Party began calling for more 
‘preferential opportunities for the backward’.77 Although India’s Constitution provided for 
reservations in legislatures and government service, the Party pushed for a greater proportion of 
reservations in ‘all high positions’ and called for reservations for women and ‘backward castes of 
religious minorities’ as well.78   
 
Even as their positions shifted, socialists continued to run up against the fact that the Indian state 
had limited resources to devote to removing inequality. Thus, even as the Congress Party resolved to 
move towards a more ‘socialistic pattern’ of society at their Avadi session in 1955, Nehru noted, 
‘Socialism…might help you to divide your existing wealth, if you like, but in India, there is no existing 
wealth for you to divide; there is only poverty to divide.’79 A central dilemma for both the Congress 
Left and the Opposition Socialists, therefore, was the question of whether to work towards 
development for all, thinly distributed, or to concentrate government efforts in selected sectors or 
regions.80 For those who held the reins of power, these were not so much duelling camps, as rival 
impulses felt at the same time within the same people. Different ministries experimented with 
different approaches to this question. For example, the Centre’s approach to agriculture began with 
an extensive Grow More Food programme in the late 1940s, which called on every Indian to join the 
‘crusade for food production’. Nehru told the public in a radio address, ‘It is a war in which every 
citizen can be a soldier and can serve his or her country.’81 However, the programme of throwing 
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better seeds, fertilisers and implements at everyone and anyone failed to produce more food. 82 As a 
consequence, and partially in response to pressure from international donors such as the Ford 
Foundation, the Centre’s policy on agriculture turned to intensive development of selected districts 
by the late 1950s.83 In education, the reverse occurred, as the Centre started out with a selective, 
intensive approach in the First Five-Year Plan. In response to pressure from below, however, the 
Centre began to move, tentatively and briefly, toward providing more extensive education in the 
Third Plan.84 It was a caricature, therefore, when Opposition Socialists pilloried Congress 
governments for concentrating on narrow slices of the economy instead of working to increase 
everyone’s wealth together. 85 
 
This is one area where the Gandhians really stood out with a markedly different vision. Gandhians 
hoped to pursue a more equal society not by lifting everyone up, but by converting everyone to a 
simpler life. Their assessment of India’s economy in the 1940s and 1950s rejected the entire basis of 
economic dynamism. For the economist and sarvodaya worker, K.G. Mashruwala, the ‘money-
dominated economy’ was one of the obstacles to the creation of a more equal society. In pursuit of 
money people chased profits ‘instead of providing for the needs of oneself and society’. The result 
was a ‘large body of parasites’ or middle men who lived off trade, commerce and rent.86 Such an 
economy was antithetical to a socialist society, as the Gandhians defined it. As Vinoba Bhave put it, 
as man makes money, he ‘loses something more precious than money, viz. the love of his fellow 
men’.87 Instead, the aim of each individual, family, village, region and nation ought to be to work for 
self-sufficiency, and no more. To most of the Gandhians, the key was to convert people to a life of 
tapas (austerity) where the ultimate aim was not prosperity, but aparagriha (non-possession).88 In 
the words of J.C. Kumarappa, the new order would entail, ‘self-control and self-discipline instead of 
self-indulgence’.89  
 
Slow, Peaceful Change 
 
This brings us to the fifth concept central to Indian socialism: non-violence. There was consensus 
that violence of any kind had to be eliminated from domestic politics.90 Of course, this aspect of 
socialist thought owed much to Gandhi and the successes of the putatively non-violent national 
movement. A non-violent approach to social change was also part of the Indian critique of Stalinism, 
where, as Nehru put it, ‘means distorted ends’, and thereby the entire project had been 
discredited.91 All of India’s socialists rejected the idea that ends could justify means. As Kamaladevi 
Chattopadhyay put it, 'Means are to a large extent ends, for an achievement is in its essence an 
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experience. Therefore, democratic practices have to be the way of life with every socialist'.92 If the 
aim was a more just and more equal society, the means to achieve that goal was democracy.  
 
Although majoritarian conceptions of democracy were common in India at this time,93 most of the 
Indian socialist thinkers considered here absolutely rejected the conflation of democracy with the 
tyranny of the religious majority at the ballot box. Instead, Gandhians and members of the Congress 
Left understood democracy as government by consensus building. Nehru termed this ‘persuasion’.94 
Bhave declared his aim was ‘converting’ his opponents to his views.95 By the early 1960s Jayaprakash 
Narayan was so averse to conflict of any kind that he advocated abolishing elections altogether 
because their adversarial nature undermined the consensus required for cooperative work.96  
 
Many accepted that such an approach would require patience. As Vijayalakshmi Pandit told a 
Canadian audience in 1958, ‘in whatever we do we must correlate ends and means and move 
forward only through the processes of democracy, even if the pace is somewhat slow’.97  
The Praja Socialist Party was a little bit different, in that, as an opposition party, they were keen on 
satyagraha (civil disobedience), at a time when most in government were arguing that the time for 
disobedience was over.98 However, this was a question of variation within a larger consensus about 
the necessity of bringing about a ‘change of heart’ through non-violence.99 Here we can see parallels 
with India’s independent foreign policy, which aimed at building consensus through institutions and 
working to resolve conflict through peaceful means.  
 
Socialist Salvation  
 
Finally, a good deal of socialist thought in India contained a spiritual dimension, which often drew on 
Vedantic influences. This facet of socialist thinking can be understood as arising in part from the 
wider context of religious reform and nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Although the Congress Party had pursued a nominally secular programme, very few of its members 
adhered to the kind of scientific, agnostic secularism that was the signature of Jawaharlal Nehru.100 
Even many of those who favoured a secular form of government understood India and its history in 
distinctly religious terms, and many often implicitly equated India with Hinduism.101 The search for a 
higher purpose for India’s socialism was not just an outgrowth of religious revival, it also a product of 
the Indian critique of Stalinism. As Jayaprakash Narayan wrote in 1951, the ‘Stalinist interpretation 
of socialist philosophy has reduced it to a crass Machiavellian code of conduct utterly devoid of any 
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sense of right or wrong, good or evil.’102 By moving away from a strict materialism, India’s socialists 
hoped to re-introduce spiritual progress in India.  
 
With their roots in Gandhi’s own beliefs and practices, Gandhian Socialists regularly incorporated 
moral and spiritual elements into their vision of an ideal society and the route to achieving it. It may 
be surprising to hear the Christian Rajkumari Amrit Kaur quoting the Upanishads and evoking 
Vedantic themes, but this was part of a larger pluralistic approach to faith, one which sought to 
reach Indians by using religious imagery. Speaking of the ideal of working to serve others, Kaur told 
an audience: ‘When your spirit joins the ever-moving air and your body is reduced to ashes, 
remember your work alone remains behind.’103 While some used metaphors rooted in religion to 
speak to their Indian audience, others viewed their project on more grandiose terms. Vinoba Bhave 
wrote of his mission in messianic terms. He declared that his project of replacing the existing social 
order with one based on ‘equality and mutual co-operation’ was nothing less than the pursuit of the 
‘salvation of mankind’.104  
 
The position of Opposition Socialists evolved on this question. By the early 1950s both Jayaprakash 
Narayan and Rammanohar Lohia had concluded that dialectical materialism was an insufficient basis 
for their version of socialism because it did not inspire moral behaviour in people.105 Rammanohar 
Lohia suggested that the answer lay in a more respectful and open approach to religion, ‘Socialists 
will also do well to feel somewhat humble towards the compassionate discipline and the ethical 
training of religion’.106 Even if they no longer ‘worshipped at the shrine of dialectical materialism’, 
they had not yet fully developed the spiritual dimension of their socialism.107 Led by Acharya 
Narendra Deva, the PSP elaborated a ‘Socialist Conception of Morality’ in 1956, which was based on 
‘Swatantra, Samata and Lokahit (liberty, equality and common good)’. Although the individual and 
his ‘self-perfection’ were at the centre of this morality, self-perfection was defined as ‘the 
sublimation of impulses… in the promotion of Lokahit.’ These were ‘moral norms’, differentiated 
from religious morality in order to accommodate India’s many religions.108 The influence of 
Vivekananda’s Vedanta, with its emphasis on self-mastery and selflessness, is evident here.  
 
Nehru had to undertake his own journey on the question of spirituality in politics. Famously, India’s 
first prime minister had admitted in the 1930s that ‘organised religion...has filled me with horror’.109 
He had no great interest in the afterlife, and a distaste for ritual. Nehru was no bigoted atheist, but 
he mostly left any talk of ‘things of the spirit’ out of his politics.110 At the second general election, 
however, Congress had won a lower share of the vote and had lost control of Kerala to the 
Communists. The moment for an adjustment seemed to have arrived. Sampurnanand, who was 
Chief Minister of India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, warned his party that the Congress was losing 
the enthusiasm of the people. To Sampurnanand, the diagnosis was obvious: ‘we have not paid any 
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attention to the spiritual element in human nature.’111 As a scholar of Sanskrit, Sampurnanand’s 
ideas were steeped in the Vedanta.112 Indians, as individuals and as a nation, he argued, needed 
‘something to live for and, if necessary, to die for’, as they had had during the campaigns for 
independence.113 According to the Congressman, 'We have to evolve a new type of humanity. The 
new man will be conscious of those spiritual bonds which unite him with all that lives and strives to 
rise to the fullness of his own self by constantly and consistently serving humanity.’114 This was a call 
for the Congress Party, and Nehru in particular, to re-orientate Congress’ ideology to reinvigorate 
the Congress movement. This would help the Party compete with the communists, who, 
Sampurnanand worried, were providing young Indians with a more compelling sense of mission.  
 
Nehru responded with a longer rumination on the nature of his project, one of the only times he 
paused to reflect in more abstract terms on his project. The result was The Basic Approach, a roughly 
twenty-page article published in the Congress Party’s Economic Review on the anniversary of 
Independence in 1958. Purushotham has recently argued that the article exemplifies ‘Nehru’s turn 
to Vedanta’.115 However, when one examines the pamphlet in more detail, and especially when one 
views it in its larger discursive context, it is clear Nehru was replying to Sampurnanand, rather than 
responding to some mysterious internal call to Vedanta. In his response, Nehru repeated his belief 
that organised religion was essentially irrelevant to the problems of the day. At the same time, 
rationalism, he conceded, ‘somehow appears to deal with the surface of things, without uncovering 
the inner core’.116 Echoing Sampurnanand, the Congress President accepted that the mind does long 
for ‘something to live for and, if necessary, something to die for’.117 But, he lamented, accepting that 
everything is connected to some Divine Impulse, ‘does not solve any…problems, and, in a sense, we 
remain where we were.’118 In the very last sentence of the article, Nehru conceded begrudgingly that 
‘perhaps’ Indians ought to keep in mind ‘Vedantic ideals’ as they sought to remedy their economic 
problems.119 This was hardly the stuff of a full conversion. Here Nehru was the outlier, conceding to 
the larger impulse within his colleagues in the Congress Left to incorporate a higher purpose into 
India’s socialism. This underlines the fact that Nehru did not define India’s socialism, solely or even 
primarily. It also gives us an important hint about India’s secularism, which will be explored further 
in the conclusion.  
 
A Lacuna: From Small Reforms to Social Transformation 
 
Indian socialist thought, like any living political ideology, contained contradictions and 
lacunae. Perhaps the most critical gap was the failure to fully imagine the process by which 
India could move from the reform of the individual to the transformation of society. 
Without violence to break existing social structures, and with often extreme deference to 
elites, there was no road map for how to realise their social and economic revolution. 
Jayaprakash Narayan went the furthest in trying to flesh out what new state structures and 
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new social relations in the countryside ought to look like in a socialist India. However, his 
vision doubled down on the necessity of proceeding by consensus and remained blind to 
the ways in which this approach reproduced deference to elites.120  
 
For many of the other socialists in India, the leap from the present to a socialist future was 
a dream that could not be set on paper. The most striking example of this is in the thought 
of Vinoba Bhave. Even he could see that persuading individual landowners to gift small 
patches of land to the poorest would not solve rural India’s problems. Indeed, it might even 
make them worse by increasing land fragmentation. Instead, he declared, 'when a 
revolution in the way of life is contemplated, it must take place in the mind.’121 The act of 
giving, he argued, would ‘generate purity of mind…and love for the poor.‘122 And then, once 
people had begun to donate, ‘the whole atmosphere will undergo a sudden change in the 
twinkling of an eye’.123 None of India’s socialists was able to offer anything more than the 
promise that a change in the psychological atmosphere would almost magically bring about 




There are, of course, limitations to what a study of political ideas alone can tell us about an historical 
period. Nonetheless, taking ideas seriously is essential if we are to gain a better understanding of the 
motives, priorities and limitations of the politics of the time. Two broad conclusions arise from a 
clearer definition of Indian socialist thought. Firstly, socialism is often used as a shorthand for the 
monopolistic ambitions of the state.124 Even scholars who have explored the ways in which state 
control over various sectors of the economy was limited by compromise, have tended to 
characterise these compromises as concessions to propertied interests.125 In other words, they 
assume the ambition of extensive state control remained intact. However, given the supremacy of 
the individual, the importance of creative work, and the centrality of private property in Indian 
socialist thought, it is clear that the socialists of the day had much more circumscribed ambitions for 
the state than has been acknowledged. All of them placed great store in private, voluntary, collective 
effort. Far from being an unwilling concession, it was regarded as an essential feature of the moral 
development of the individual-in-society. True, their thoughts on the question of nationalised 
property evolved, but it is significant that by the early 1950s most Indian socialists were not even 
thinking of a state monopoly over economic life, let alone over the social life of the people. In 
important ways Indian socialism was a socialism of self-help. This has implications for how historians 
view state projects and where we might look for political impetus.  
 
Finally, understanding India’s socialism will help historians begin to re-evaluate the so-called 
Nehruvian consensus of the period 1947-1964. Nehru was a man of immense intellect, integrity and 
energy. He was at times a great statesman. But he was not a big thinker. He often declined to put a 
clear definition on the lofty concepts that guided his politics. Therefore, the influence of his thought 
over postcolonial Indian politics has almost certainly been overstated. For example, we have seen 
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that conceptions of India as an essentially Hindu nation were pervasive amongst socialists, though 
Nehru did not share them. He was only a reluctant and partial convert to the idea that the socialist 
project ought to have a spiritual mission. Recognising this helps us understand not only Indian 
socialism, but the struggles for the soul of Indian secularism, another creed strongly associated with 
Nehru, which historians have recently shown was more contested than a narrow focus on one 
individual would admit.126 The time now seems ripe for a larger re-evaluation of the Nehruvian 
consensus.   
 
The women and men who thought of themselves as socialists were engaged in decades-long debates 
with one another, but also with competing ideologies in India. To the left of India’s socialists were 
India’s communists. Making the same mistake as the socialists of the 1950s, historians have 
caricatured Indian communism and refused to investigate this set of political ideas on its own terms. 
To the right, the Swatantra Party and its associated thinkers grappled with evolving ideas about the 
relative weight of the state and the market, individual and society. Below the national level, parties 
based on language, region, religion, or caste affiliations generated their own answers to India’s 
political problems and identified different ones of their own, often in the vernacular. In sum, the first 
two decades after independence were a time of vibrant political debates, which historians have 
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